The experience of low-and middle-income countries (LMC) with respect to regulation and legislation in the health sector is in marked contrast to that of Canada and Europe. It is suggested that the degree to which regulatory mechanisms can influence private sector activity in LMC is quite low. However, there has been little work done on exploring just how, and to what extent, these regulations fail. Through the use of stakeholder interviews, this study explored the effectiveness of regulations directed at the private-for-profit sector (general practitioners, private clinics and hospitals) in Zimbabwe. The study found that there was limited and asymmetric knowledge of basic regulations among government bodies and private providers.
Introduction
The health care market in Zimbabwe has been characterized by a dominant public sector in both provision and financing of health services. However, after national independence in 1980, a private sector made up of both non-profit providers (missions, voluntary and charitable organizations) and a private for-profit sector (private general practitioners, private hospitals and medical aid societies) began to grow. In 1993 it was estimated that about 92% of health services in Zimbabwe were provided by government health institutions, 5% by mission hospitals and non-governmental organizations, and the remainder by the private for-profit sector. In recent years there has been rapid development in the private for-profit sector. By 1996, it was estimated that about 45% of registered doctors worked full-time in the private sector, 56% of whom were based in Harare (Hongoro et al. 2000) .
While there has been a fair amount of research on health sector regulation in industrialized countries, there is limited evidence from developing countries (WHO 1991; Asiimwe and Lule 1993; Mujinja et al. 1993; Yesudian 1994; Bennett and Ngalande-Banda 1994; Bhat 1996; Bhutta and Balchin, 1996; Kumaranayake 1997; Stenson et al. 1997) . In Zimbabwe, although basic legislation such as registration/ licensing requirements for private practice exists, there is paucity of information on how they are implemented and enforced, and their overall effectiveness. The increasing role of the private sector necessitates an examination of what the pre-conditions and markers for effective regulation are, and the possible role of regulatory instruments in policy and planning.
The Public-Private Mix Collaborative Research Network (PPMNet) research on regulation was designed to examine the nature of existing regulatory structures and also explore issues related to effectiveness. The research strategy was designed in two phases (shown in Figure 1 ). In the first phase, a comparative mapping exercise was undertaken in order to describe the existing network of regulations within the health sector. Analysis of the results for Tanzania and Zimbabwe are presented in Kumaranayake et al. (2000, this issue ). In the second phase, specific regulations were explored in detail in order to consider issues related to their effectiveness. This was complemented by the use of micro examples that were used to shed light on the functioning of the regulatory apparatus.
This study is the second phase of the research study in Zimbabwe. Whereas the first phase described the existing regulatory framework addressing the health sector, the focus of this research is on understanding factors influencing the effectiveness of the current regulatory environment in Zimbabwe, examining five pieces of legislation affecting for-profit providers. The research uses stakeholder perceptions to explore how these regulations work, and uses a conceptual framework to explore whether regulations are not working because preconditions for effective regulation were not in place or whether the regulations are not functioning due to problems in the process of implementation. The next section of the paper describes the conceptual framework, and is followed by a section describing the five pieces of legislation that the study has focused upon. The fourth section describes the methods of data collection, and is followed by sections on the stakeholders and their knowledge of the regulations and an analysis of the factors influencing effectiveness. We conclude by discussing potential strategies for improving the effectiveness of these regulations.
Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework is taken from Kumaranayake (1998) and is described below. Key terms used in the study are defined:
• Regulation refers to an 'action to manipulate prices, quantities (distribution) and quality' (Maynard 1982) in order to obtain a number of objectives such as improved equity and increased access to services.
• Regulatory instruments refer to the specific methods used to affect price, quantity or quality, for example approval of private facilities.
Regulatory instruments can be divided into two categories. Legal controls are legislated requirements that can lead to punitive action if they are not met. Incentives can also be used to affect (enable) price, quantity or quality. This can be done through government financing of specific activities/programmes. For example, providing subsidies for physicians to work in under-served areas is a financial incentive which affects the distribution of health services providers.
In addition to the definition of regulations, there is a need for indicators of effectiveness and a need to identify the factors that influence effectiveness of regulatory instruments. Effectiveness can be measured at two levels:
( Given these questions, there are broad categories of possible factors that may be influential in responding to these questions. Figure 2 highlights these factors, some of which have been derived from .
The key factors are information, capacity, power/authority and context. Effectiveness is reliant on both the question of design (which relates to issues such as appropriateness for market structures and incentive structures that flow from the nature of the design) and the manner of implementation. A poorly designed intervention will have limited impact, and an intervention which is not designed to address the particular issues appropriately, although well-implemented, will also have limited overall impact on what it is trying to achieve. In order to assess whether the pre-conditions for effective regulation are in place, it is important to be able to assess how each of these factors affects overall effectiveness. The main dimensions related to each factor are presented in Table 1 .
The aim of the study was to consider the effectiveness of health sector regulations affecting the private sector in relation to these factors and their dimensions. Clearly one of the most important questions is just how effectiveness can be measured. In this study the issue of effectiveness is primarily related to whether the regulation has the desired impact on the regulatee. We qualitatively measure impact through the perceptions of various stakeholders involved in the regulatory process. The strength of such an approach is that it allows for the specific context to be taken into account, and by using a range of stakeholders we can explore the perception of effectiveness from a Figure 1 . Research strategy. Source: Kumaranayake and Lake (1998) number of perspectives. The limits of such an approach are that there is no baseline by which to compare (e.g. effectiveness compared to what?) and the results are somewhat subjective. However, by using a range of stakeholders' perceptions of effectiveness, the results can be triangulated. A qualitative study also allows us to deepen our understanding of the reasons for the limited impact of the regulations. In order to explore the effect of different factors in the functioning of the regulations, their dimensions, as shown in Table 1 , will be assessed.
Regulations affecting the private for-profit sector in Zimbabwe
As there were only limited attempts to distinguish between private and public providers in the legislation encountered, we chose five specific pieces of legislation which were thought to be most relevant to private for profit providers in Zimbabwe. A description of these five acts is given below. There is significant overlap between these acts, in terms of the variables they are trying to control, and the agencies that are responsible for their enforcement. Some of the key pieces of legislation are as follows.
(1) Medical, Dental and Allied Professions Act (MDAP),
1971/1996
The act legislates the control of entry and quality of services provided by individuals or institutions. It also provides for the establishment of a Health Professions Council (HPC) which is responsible for enforcing the act. The HPC is mandated to carry out four principal functions: registration of health 
(3) Drugs and Allied Substances Control Act (DAS), 1969
The act controls for the registration, purchase, sale and dispensing of drugs and allied substances. It provides for the establishment of a Drugs Control Council (DCC), recently changed to the Medicines Control Authority (MCA), responsible for implementing the provisions of the law. Licensing of premises or persons to dispense drugs, and inspections of premises and drugs are done by the DCC (MCA).
(4) Traditional Medical Practitioners Act (TMA), 1981
The act provides for the formation of the Traditional Medical Practitioners Council, which is responsible for the registration and discipline of all traditional healers. Research into traditional medicine is also controlled by this act. This law controls the quantity and quality of traditional medicine through registration of practitioners.
(5) Dangerous Drugs Act (DDA), 1956
This act serves to control the importation, exportation, production, possession, sale, distribution and use of dangerous drugs. It also provides for the establishment of an inspectorate, which can institute inquiries on premises owned by pharmaceutical chemists, general dealers or licensed manufacturers of any drug to which the act refers. The act is enforced by the DCC (MCA).
Among all of these regulatory bodies, the HPC is seen as the main health regulatory body.
Methods
An assessment of the regulatory environment and the effectiveness of these five regulations was undertaken using the perceptions of various stakeholders in the regulatory process. The study population includes key informants and opinion leaders in:
• the public sector;
• professional organizations;
• medical aid societies (private health insurance);
• civic organizations;
• general practitioners;
• private hospitals and clinics;
• local authorities.
The 1997 study covered five of the eight regions in the country (Matebeleland South, Matebeleland North, Masvingo, Manicaland and Midlands) and ten major towns or districts (Harare, Bulawayo, Mutare, Masvingo, Kwekwe, Plumtree, Nkayi, Ndanga, Mutasa and Gweru).
Structured interviews using open-ended questions were used. Four different questionnaires were used for each of the main groups (public sector, private sector, civic and consumer groups, and local authorities) with some overlapping questions. Interviews focused on the respondents': (1) (3) views about HPC as the main regulating body.
There were a total of 122 respondents. Of these 40 were drawn from the public sector and included Provincial Medical Directors, Provincial Health Executives, selected District Health Executives, and selected Rural Health Centres. There were 46 general practitioners working in private surgeries, hospitals or group practices. Some worked in both the public and private sectors, and most were members of professional associations. We shall refer to this group of 46 practitioners as private sector providers. The remaining respondents were drawn from representatives of consumer/civil groups, professional medical associations and medical aid societies. Table 2 presents a detailed description of the stakeholders who were included under the different categories and their knowledge of regulations derived from the survey questionnaire.
The stakeholders and their knowledge of regulations
Although a reasonable knowledge of laws/regulations was demonstrated, there was variability in the knowledge of different regulations. Individuals were asked which pieces of legislation affecting the private sector they were familiar with. Figures 3 and 4 summarize the responses from the public sector and private provider respondents. Not surprisingly, both groups had good knowledge of the basic registration and licensing requirements. Surprisingly, only about 38% of public sector officials mentioned knowledge of the PHA. It was clear from the responses that general practitioners generally knew only the regulations that directly affected their activities and the other legislation was not well known.
Local authorities (under which City Health Departments fall) are established under the Urban Council Act (revised in 1997) and an important component of their responsibility is looking after the health of urban populations. With this mandate, the local authorities were consulted principally as regulators of the private sector providers, in recognition of their roles which include inspection of health facilities to Public sector 40 respondents from the public sector including: More than 75% had familiarity with MDAP, less than 40% had familiarity with PHA.
• Ministry of Health and Child Welfare officials (national level)
Very limited knowledge of other pieces of legislation.
• Provincial medical directors, provincial health executives, selected rural health centres.
• Health Professions Council officials.
Private sector providers • 46 general practitioners working in private surgeries, hospitals About 65% had familiarity with MDAP, less than 15% had familiarity with PHA. or group practices.
Representatives Parliament, no real knowledge about specific laws or instruments.
• Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions
Not aware of specific functions of HPC.
• Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace Local authority officials were also generally aware of the specific regulations under which they operate, but did not have knowledge of the broader range of regulations.
Respondents from civic organizations, human rights and consumer pressure groups generally perceived the regulatory environment as being associated with Acts of Parliament or Laws from the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare or the HPC. It was more difficult for these respondents to identify the specific laws or instruments actually in force. Representatives from the medical aid societies were also well versed in the specific Acts which related to them, but had more limited knowledge of the broader legislation.
Factors affecting effectiveness
Do these regulations work? There was clear consensus among all the stakeholders that current regulations were ineffective; in particular, concerns were raised regarding the effectiveness of the regulations and their enforcement relative to the private medical sector. It was feared that many problems are going unnoticed and that the government at present does not know what exactly is happening in that sector. Table 3 provides a summary of the issues raised and the range of views as to why regulations are not effective. Given the lack of knowledge of all of the legislation, much of the discussion in the remainder of the paper is around the MDAP and PHA legislation. The general view is that the existing laws and regulations are not being enforced, although the reasons differ substantially. Many of the public sector respondents attributed the failure of regulation to the providers not adhering to regulations, e.g. recruiting unlicensed workers and over-prescribing. In contrast, many of the private provider responses focused on the lack of public resources (e.g. inspections) faced by the HPC.
Regulations were also thought to be too cumbersome.
The private sector respondents also raised the issue of who inspects the inspectors, as many of the inspectors are health professionals themselves. Local authorities felt that the HPC could not carry out their inspection function, and so are unable to enforce the regulations. Consumer groups highlighted that there were no known cases where complaints to the HPC were actually followed through and suggested that the problems of high prices and low quality seen in the private sector were evidence that regulations were not working. Medical aid society respondents suggested that regulations were being flouted, highlighting specific cases of fraudulent activity by private providers and the fact that professional codes of conduct were continuously being flouted.
Clearly the perception of regulation is rooted in the respondents' relative role in the health care system. It is not surprising that we have differing perceptions which line up with individual self-interests. Open-ended questions about the role of the HPC and possible recommendations for change provided a greater insight into the factors influencing functioning of the regulatory environment, and are summarized below in terms of the conceptual framework in Figure 2 .
Design
Public sector respondents felt that present laws were outdated and needed review. For example, the Public Health Act is seen as old-fashioned. It does not clearly reflect the realities of the current health sector, hence the need for a review.
There is need for a clear-cut policy on pollution control and legislation. Immunization, infant nutrition and HIV/AIDS are not properly covered, the latter being a major issue given Zimbabwe's very high prevalence. Present laws do not clearly address the private for-profit sector and need review. The absence of more targeted laws relevant to the private sector facilitates the opportunistic behaviour of private providers and does not address problems specific to the private sector, such as the wide variation in price and quality. There were inadequate price and quality assurance mechanisms to address this in the design of current legislation. While the legislation had clear accountability mechanisms (e.g. regulatee to regulator), the complaints' mechanisms for consumers and patients were less clear. The legislation reviewed also had clear mechanisms for active monitoring (e.g. inspections). However, the need for different laws must be balanced against the perception that the current network of regulations is already too cumbersome for providers to follow.
Information
The regulators (e.g. HPC) lack significant information about the composition and functioning of the private sector. The HPC does not have a good sense of how many private forprofit providers exist (e.g. private clinics, maternity homes, surgeries). Although the process of registration of private providers has now started, there is no clarity about the size of the group and their geographical spread. The HPC only knows the number of professionals that are allowed to do private practice. However, in reality a physician can run more than one surgery or clinic, since once they are given a license, it is possible for them to establish more private clinics. Private sector activities are unknown. It is not clear what the number of patients being seen is, nor the type of illnesses that are being treated. Urban local authorities are better informed about the numbers of private practitioners in their localities and do receive some statistics on notifiable diseases from them (as per the PHA).
Paradoxically, the private sector also complained about the lack of information it had about the HPC. The HPC was not considered to be a transparent organization. Its only visible role was in the issuing of certificates each year and collecting fees. HPC disciplinary inquiries are done in camera and most cases are not disclosed to the public, although the regulations state that such results are published in a government gazette. Much of the discussion emphasized that consumers of health services are not very conversant with their rights and expectations from health care providers, be they public or private. As such, they are not very certain as to what they should do in the event that they perceive they have been ill-treated, or have not received services up to their expected standard; neither are they sure of who to contact and where. Given their limited awareness of the legislation, consumers are generally unaware of their rights and what to do in cases of suspected malpractice. Currently there are no clear communication channels to the HPC, unless an issue arises through the media.
Hence there seem to be major asymmetries of information between the regulator and regulatee (e.g. the HPC and physicians). Interestingly, the medical aid societies, who provide private insurance and so are intimately involved with the private sector providers, seemed to have much better information about on-going practices and provided a range of examples of fradulent behaviour by private physicians, including:
• Young, unqualified physicians running private clinics under the 'licensing' of experienced practitioners as well as nurses operating private clinics without the required back-up of licensed physicians.
• Over-servicing of patients: patients being referred to other physicians without reason, and unnecessary repeated procedures (e.g. dilation and curettage, skin biopsies).
• Defrauding the medical aid societies: patients signing for drugs which they never receive, but have been sold elsewhere; fallacious claims for procedures; colluding with patients to claim reimbursement for visits which have not taken place. In 1999, there were a number of court cases in which doctors were alleged (and later proven) to have defrauded medical aid societies through such false claims.
• Directly in contravention to legislation which does not allow medical practitioners to have financial interests in medical aid societies and other facilities, physicians promote their own financial interests by self-referrals to laboratories and surgeries over the course of public and private practice. They are also forming consortia to run private facilities that are not open to the scrutiny of the public.
While it is difficult to know how widespread these activities are, the sense is that there are significant problems within the practices of private providers.
Capacity
Both public and private sector respondents felt that the HPC was ineffective. It was seen to operate passively as a keeper of records (e.g. registrations) rather than being more active in improving the impact of regulations (e.g. monitoring quality or promoting continuing education for professionals). The main constraint identified pertained to manpower shortages, which have especially affected HPC's ability to maintain an inspectorate. Until 1996, the HPC almost solely relied on membership subscriptions and other fees/fines to finance activities. Currently, the HPC employs a Registrar and six or eight supporting staff in Harare. This lack of manpower significantly impedes the ability of the HPC to handle complaints, conduct inspections and hold public awareness campaigns. HPC members are also employed full-time elsewhere, and so the HPC meets irregularly unless there is a crisis. Almost all respondents felt that the HPC was too centralized.
There are too many regulatory agencies and the process of registration is cumbersome. For example, a private facility dispensing drugs needs to have HPC registration for personnel and premises, licensing for dispensing drugs by the DCC, registration with professional organizations (voluntary), subscription to the Defence Medical Union for legal backup, and licensing by local authorities.
The Local City Health Departments were found to have varied functions. Before September 1995, they used to register private institutions in terms of the Nurses Home Act (now non-functional). In 1995, the role of registering health institutions was shifted from local authorities to the HPC. The HPC then realized that it could not just approve applications to private practitioners and issue licenses without carrying out prior inspections. That is when it reached an understanding that allowed the local authorities to continue carrying out inspections before licenses could be issued. These arrangements are nothing more than a gentleman's agreement which could end at any time. This in effect means it is an informal agreement, which does not specify any terms of reference or contractual agreement, is not a binding arrangement, and only exists as a result of good rapport between the Chairman of HPC and Directorates of City Health Department.
Despite the informal nature of the agreement, most local authorities indicated that inspections are done and that bylaws are being enforced effectively. The very fact that the arrangement is not binding does not give a sense of responsibility on the part of local authorities to carry out the inspections thoroughly as a matter of duty. They may yet decide to stop it and nothing will happen; this is largely dependent on the personalities of the directors involved. However, since it does not have any official power, medical practitioners may refuse to accept the results of City Health Department inspections since they are not legally binding. This is because the law does not provide for the City Health Department to carry out inspections, and as such their findings may be taken to be mere opinion, which cannot legally prevent a practitioner from operating.
Power/authority
Respondents felt that the composition of the HPC partly contributes to its ineffectiveness. They mentioned over-representation of some professions (e.g. doctors) which, they argue, is a classic case of regulatory capture, stifling efforts to conduct inspections in surgeries and private rooms, and contributing to the perception of alleged unfairness in dealing with complaints against doctors.
The power of the Minister of Health and Child Welfare to appoint up to one-third of Council members has also been identified as a potential source of unfairness and further conflict within the HPC. Some people feel that the HPC cannot therefore be independent in making unbiased decisions and suffers from direct political influence on deliberations of the HPC. This, coupled with the fact that the HPC is now receiving Ministry funding, further diminishes the independence of the HPC.
Unlike countries such as India (Bhat 1996) , the credibility of the judicial system in Zimbabwe is difficult to judge, as so few cases have been through it. Those cases that have resorted to the judicial system, rather than HPC, have faced significant delays awaiting a judgement. Civic organizations emphasized the general tradition of subservience and paternalism as limiting the number of public complaints about the health system. Although the number of complaints is slowly rising, no case has yet been successfully followed through. While consumer groups exist, their relative knowledge of the regulations and ability to influence the regulatory process are extremely limited. Professional organizations do seem to have authority over their members and have codes of practice for them to follow. However, membership is voluntary.
Context
There is clearly a very political dimension to the functioning of the regulatory system. The main regulatory body, the HPC, is seen to be quite susceptible to political influence. The dominance of the medical profession in the regulatory structures has also been highlighted as a reason why there are weaknesses in regulation enforcement and an inability to impose punishment for offenders. This is also reinforced by the high status in which medical professionals are held in Zimbabwean society. The economic circumstances facing Zimbabwe mean that the resources available to implement and enforce the regulations are insufficient.
Conclusion
The results of the study show a clear consensus that regulations are not being enforced effectively in Zimbabwe. A variety of opportunistic behaviours among private providers has been documented, including: practices of self-referral where patients are referred to other services where the provider has financial interests; over-servicing; doctor-patient collusion; falsely billing private insurance for non-existent patients; and the use of unlicensed doctors in private clinics. Existing regulations are outdated and inadequate for the current environment of private sector health provision. Key problems apparent in enforcing existing regulations in Zimbabwe include the multiple agencies enforcing regulations, weaknesses of the main regulatory body, inadequate design of current regulations, and insufficient resources. The current regulatory framework does not provide for non-profit private providers or restrictions on private insurance companies such as medical aid societies (although entry of the latter could be regulated by the Medical Services Act recently given parliamentary approval).
There were mixed views and tensions about the role of the main regulatory body, the HPC, how it is organized and the reasons for its inability to implement the regulations. One dominant theme was its centralized nature and its lack of resources. The emergence of informal arrangements between local authorities and the HPC can be seen as a way to decentralize the regulatory body's functions, and as a coping mechanism in the face of scarce resources. However, this informality also limits local government in taking decisive action against violators of the regulations. Professional organizations felt that non-legal mechanisms such as peer review and internal audits may be ways to improve private provider behaviour without needing extensive resources for implementation.
While a number of the pre-conditions for effective regulation seem to be apparent in Zimbabwe, the overall design relies on the existence of a relatively well-resourced regulatory structure, which is not apparent in this context. The research suggests a number of ways to improve the functioning of the current regulatory environment. There is a need to develop strategies to formalize the role of local authorities and professional associations in implementing regulations. Enforcement at a more decentralized level might also address a number of the issues related to poor information, as local authorities have greater knowledge of their environment. Consumers can play a significant role in promoting regulatory effectiveness through public awareness and education, but the role needs to be developed within the context of the current regulatory framework. Finally, the importance of information availability is central to the implementation of the regulations. This suggests embarking on strategies to influence providers through information, training and persuasion (Musgrove 1996) .
